By FRNash/PHX, AZ (Frnash) on Sunday, December 9, 2007 - 09:55 pm:
David Soumis (Davesou):
"The dropping of the A-bomb on Japan was totally wrong."
Horrific though that was, I'm not so sure I agree. Would the alternative have been better, or dramatically worse? We could debate that unto eternity, but perhaps we can never really know.
Consider the centuries long Japanese traditions of Bushidō, and the Samurai, especially as manifested in the so-called Banzai charge, or human-wave style suicide attacks mounted by the infantry forces of the Imperial Japanese Army, and the airborne variant, the Imperial Japanese Navy's Kamikaze attacks on ther US Naval Fleet in the Pacific.
Consider also our experience on many of the Pacific islands, such as Saipan, Iwo Jima, Guadalcanal and Okinawa, for example, where the Japanese were determined to fight to the last man.
There was little doubt that the Japanese would have fought to the death, to the last man, woman and child had we undertook Operation Downfall, the planned invasion of Japan, which would have resulted in far more massive casualties on both sides.
Quote:Because the U.S. military planners assumed "that operations in this area will be opposed not only by the available organized military forces of the Empire, but also by a fanatically hostile population", high casualties were thought to be inevitable, but nobody knew with certainty how high.
A study done for Secretary of War Henry Stimson's staff by William Shockley estimated that conquering Japan would cost 1.7 to 4 million American casualties, including 400,000 to 800,000 fatalities, and five to ten million Japanese fatalities. The key assumption was large-scale participation by civilians in the defense of Japan.
Outside the government, well-informed civilians were also making guesses. Kyle Palmer, war correspondent for the Los Angeles Times, said half a million to a million Americans would die by the end of the war. Herbert Hoover, in memorandums submitted to Truman and Stimson, also estimated 500,000 to 1,000,000 fatalities, and were believed to be conservative estimates; but it is not known if Hoover discussed these specific figures in his meetings with Truman.
Waiting for the Japanese to surrender was not a cost-free option — as a result of the war, noncombatants were dying throughout Asia at a rate of about 200,000 per month. Firebombing had killed well over 100,000 people in Japan since February of 1945, directly and indirectly. Intensive conventional bombing would have continued or increased prior to an invasion.
There certainly has been much